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Comments
Application of a Heightened Standard of
Proof Is Not Very Clear and Convincing
Under 11 U.S.C. Section 727(a)*
The United States Constitution confers upon Congress the
power to establish uniform laws regarding bankruptcies.'
Bankruptcy is an equitable proceeding designed to eliminate the
inefficiencies and inequities of nonbankruptcy collection law.2 The
Bankruptcy Code attempts to alleviate these inequities by
promoting a system whereby similarly situated creditors receive
similar treatment
The ultimate benefit that chapter 7 bankruptcy offers an
individual debtor is the discharge.4 Through discharge, the Code
enables the debtor to obtain a financial fresh start.' Discharge
provides the honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh opportunity in
life and a clean slate for future financial effort, unhampered by the
pressures of insurmountable preexisting debt.6
* The author wishes to thank the Honorable James N. Barr, United States Bankruptcy Court,
Central District of California, for his encouragement and thoughtful observations during the writing
of this Comment.
I. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, ci. 4.
2. T. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND Lnvirrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAw, 16-17 (1986). Without the
protection of bankruptcy, a financially troubled debtor is often subject to "creditor assault" where
each individual creditor is concerned only with recovering the debt owed to the creditor, without
consideration of the interests of the other creditors or the debtor. Id. at 9. This scenario is frequently
referred to as "grab" law. Id.
3. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941); H.R REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 177-78,340 (1977) (declaring that the underlying theme of bankruptcy is equa-
fity of asset distribution).
4. Jackson, The Fresh StartPolicy ln Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1393,1393 (1985).
5. In re Levitan, 46 Bankr. 380, 383 (Bankr.E.D. N.Y. 1985).
6. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934); Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554 (1915) (stating
that the bankruptcy discharge provides the honest but unfortunate debtor with a fresh start in business
and economic life).
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In a chapter 7 bankruptcy, a discharge under section 727(a)
discharges the debtor from all debts that arose prior to the date of
the order for relief issued by the bankruptcy court, 7 subject to the
limitations of section 523(a).8 A discharge is a court order
declaring that a person is entitled to immunity from any actions by
creditors to collect debts existing on the date the bankruptcy
petition was filed.9 Individuals receive a discharge from
bankruptcy if they do not violate any of the ten grounds for denial
of the discharge listed in section 727(a)."0 If an objecting creditor
or the bankruptcy trustee believes that the debtor is not entitled to
discharge, the objecting party must file an adversary proceeding in
the bankruptcy court to obtain a judgment denying the
discharge." If a complaint objecting to discharge is not filed
within the requisite time period,12 absent any extension of time,
the discharge will be granted by the bankruptcy court.13
The Bankruptcy Code provision that governs denial of a chapter
7 discharge is section 727(a). 4 Bankruptcy Rule 4005 is the
corresponding procedural rule that addresses the burden of proof
7. 11 U.S.C § 727(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
8. Id. Section 523(a) enumerates certain debts that are nondischargeable. I 1 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(1982 & Supp. 1987). All income and excise taxes for the three years immediately preceding
bankruptcy are nondischargeable. Id. § 523(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Domestic obligations
including child support and alimony for the maintenance or support of a spouse are nondisehargeable.
Id. § 523(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Fines, penalties, or forfeitures that the debtor owes to a
governmental body may not be discharged unless the debt is compensation for an actual pecuniary
loss or a penalty assessed on a dischargeable tax. Id. § 523(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Most
educational debts guaranteed by a governmental entity or a nonprofit institution may not be
discharged. Id. § 523(a)(8) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Obligations incurred as a result of the debtor
driving while intoxicated are nondischargeable. Id. § 523(a)(9) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Debts that were
listed in a prior bankruptcy case, or could have been listed in a prior case, are nondischargeable. Id.
§ 523(a)(10) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
9. 1 CowANs, BANKRupPcy LAW AND PRAcncE § 5.3 (1989).
10. See infra note 32 (explaining the ten exceptions to discharge enumerated in section
727(a)).
11. BANut. R.P. 4004(a). In a chapter 7 case, a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge
under section 727(a) must be filed not later than 60 days after the irst meeting of creditors held
pursuant to section 341(a). Id.
12. Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a) states that a complaint objecting to the debtor's discharge under
section 727(a) must be filed within 60 days following the first meeting of creditors. BANKR. R.P.
4004(a).
13. BANKR. R.P. 4004(c).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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for actions pursuant to section 727(a). 15 Neither section 727(a) nor
Rule 4005, however, addresses the standard of proof required to
sustain that burden.16
The Bankruptcy Code and its legislative history are also silent
regarding the requisite standard of proof, as are the Bankruptcy
Rules and Advisory Committee Notes thereto. 7 In the absence of
any clear legislative guidance, the courts have failed to reach a
consensus on whether the appropriate standard under section 727(a)
is a preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing
evidence. The clear and convincing standard of proof has been
defined as that which supports the court's findings and conclusions
with a high degree of certainty."8 The preponderance of the
evidence standard is defined as evidence which is of greater weight
or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in
opposition to it. 9
Part I of this Comment discusses the current state of the law
dealing with the requisite standard of proof for objections to
discharge, with primary focus upon the mechanics of section 727(a)
and relevant policy considerations.20 Part II will consider the
existing case law and underlying rationale that supports the
respective standards.2 Part III analyzes the theories that support
the application of each standard and considers several arguments
against application of the clear and convincing standard.22 Finally,
15. BANKR. R.P. 4005. The burden of proof refers to the obligation of a party to introduce
evidence that is sufficient to avoid a ruling against the party on the issue. State Farm Life Ins. Co.
v. Smith, 29 IlL App. 3d 942, 331 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1975). The standard of proof refers to the
sufficiency ofevidence in quantitative terms that the party bearing the burden ofproofmust establish.
Id.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987); BANKR. R.P. 4005. See infra note 39 and
accompanying text (discussing the burden of proof in discharge actions).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The House and Senate reports do not address
the requisite standard of proof under section 727(a). Instead, the reports merely restate the statutory
language set forth in the Code. H.R. REP. No. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 384-85 (1977); S. REP. No.
989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98-99 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787,
5884-85, 6340-41.
18. In re Drayman, 77 Bankr. 773, 775 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987).
19. Braud v. Kinchen, 310 So. 2d 657, 659 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
20. See infra notes 24-74 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 75-165 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 166-216 and accompanying text.
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Part IV concludes that the preponderance of the evidence standard
is the appropriate standard of proof that an objecting party must
sustain to satisfy its burden in an action to deny a discharge under
section 727(a).23
I. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Section 727 is the Bankruptcy Code provision addressing
chapter 7 discharge.24 An individual debtor is granted a discharge
unless the debtor has violated any of the ten grounds for denial
asserted in section 727(a),' and an objecting party in interest
brings an adversary proceeding to deny the debtor's discharge.
2 6
Section 727(a), which completely denies discharge, must be
distinguished from section 523(a). An action under section 523(a)
merely excepts a single debt from discharge,27 whereas a
successful action under section 727(a) has the effect of completely
denying the debtor from discharge.28 If an objecting creditor
establishes an exception to discharge under section 523, only that
creditor may attempt to collect its debt from the debtor; all other
dischargeable prepetition claims are discharged.29 If an objection
to discharge under section 727(a) is successfully established, all
creditors may attempt to collect the unpaid balance of their claims
from the debtor.3"
23. See infra notes 217-218 and accompanying text.
24. 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
25. See supra note 10 (discussing the ten grounds for denial of discharge enumerated in
section 727(a)).
26. Id. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
27. Id. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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A. Analysis of Section 727(a)
Section 727(a) provides that the bankruptcy court shall grant a
discharge to an individual chapter 731 debtor unless one or more
of the specific grounds for denying the discharge listed in section
727(a)(1)-(10) is established.32 Grounds for denying discharge
must be proved in an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy
court.33 Absent a judgment pursuant to section 727(a), section
727(b) discharges the debtor from all debts that arose prior to the
date of the order for relief.34
The discharge relieves the debtor of all responsibility for
discharged debts and provides a fresh start in business and in
life. Once the discharge has been granted by the bankruptcy
31. Section 727 is confined to chapter 7 cases; discharge under the other chapters of the Code
is governed by 11 U.S.C. section 944(b) (chapter 9); section 1141(d)(1)(A) (chapter 11); and section
1328 (chapter 13).
32. The first ground for denial of discharge is that the debtor is not an individual. 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The second ground for denial is the fraudulent transfer or
concealment of assets within the twelve months preceding the bankruptcy or after the commencement
of the case. Id. § 727(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The third ground for denial is the fraudulent
concealment of information, or the failure to maintain adequate books and records from which the
debtor's financial condition may be ascertained. Id. § 727(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The fourth
ground for denial of discharge is the making of false statements in connection with the bankruptcy
proceeding or the commission of a bankruptcy crime. Id. § 727(a)(4) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The fifth
ground is the failure of the debtor to satisfactorily explain any loss of assets or any deficiency of
assets to meet the debtor's liabilities. Id. § 727(a)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The sixth ground for
denial is the failure to cooperate with the bankruptcy court by refusing to testify after having been
granted immunity or after improperly invoking the constitutional privilege against self incrimination,
or by refusing to obey any lawful order of the court. Id. § 727(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The
seventh ground for denial of discharge is the commission of any act specified in grounds two through
six during the twelve months prior to the debtor's case in connection with another bankruptcy case
concerning an insider. Id. § 727(a)(7) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The eighth and ninth grounds for denial
are if the debtor has received a discharge in another bankruptcy proceeding commenced within six
years prior to the filing of the current case, unless the prior case was a chapter 13 case where the
debtor had repaid all or a substantial portion of its indebtedness. Id. §§ 727(a)(8)-(9) (1982 & Supp.
1987). The tenth ground for denial of discharge is approval by the bankruptcy court of a waiver of
discharge. Id. § 727(a)(10) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
33. BANKR. R.P. 7001.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
35. 3 COLIER'S ON BANKRUFrcY § 727.01[l] (1990). The effects of the discharge are
enumerated in section 524 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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court, the debtor does not have the power to reaffimn or otherwise
become legally obligated upon any discharged debt. 6
Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Bankruptcy Rules address
the standard of proof under section 727(a), and the issue remains
unsettled in the federal courts. 7 Bankruptcy Rule 4005 is the
applicable procedural rule for actions pursuant to section 727(a).3
Rule 4005 mandates that the objecting creditor bears the burden of
proof as to whether the debtor violated one of the grounds for
discharge under section 727(a),39 but Rule 4005 does not mention
the standard of proof required to sustain that burden.4 ° Rule 4005
leaves to the courts the formulation of rules governing the burden
of persuasion.41
Section 727(a) of the Code and its legislative history are also
silent regarding the requisite standard of proof.42 The issue
remains unresolved in that the United States Supreme Court has
never examined the issue of the appropriate standard of proof
required under section 727(a). The federal bankruptcy courts, which
provide the majority of available case authority, are in
disagreement in their interpretation of the appropriate standard of
proof.
43
36. 11 U.S.C. § 524(f) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The debtor is not precluded from voluntarily
repaying an otherwise dischargeable debt prior to discharge. Id.
37. See In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315, 329 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988) (stating that the cases dealing
with the issue of the standard of proof under section 727(a) are unreconcilably conflicting),
38. BANKR. R.P. 4005. Rule 4005 only applies to section 727. Id.
39. BANKR. R.P. 4005. Rule 4005 states in pertinent part: "At the trial on a complaint
objecting to a discharge, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the objection." Id.
40. BANKR. R. P. 4005, Advisory Committee Note. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule
4005 state in pertinent part:
mT3he rule does not address the burden of going forward with the evidence. Subject to the
allocation by the rule of the initial burden of producing evidence and the ultimate burden or
persuasion, the rule leaves to the courts the formulation of rules governing the shift of the
burden of going forward with evidence ....
Id.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the failure the House and Senate
reports to address the requisite standard of proof under section 727(a)).
43. See In re Kim, 97 Bankr. 275, 281 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (applying the preponderance
of the evidence standard to discharge and dischargeability actions). See also In re Mayo, 94 Bankr.
315, 329 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988); In re Booth, 70 Bankr. 391, 394 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (applying
the clear and convincing standard to discharge and dischargeability actions).
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The majority of the cases which dare to elect one standard of
proof over the other do so without any explanation whatsoever,
merely stating their selection and citing to some other decision that
also applied the selected standard without any supporting
rationale." The opinions that have attempted to offer persuasive
reasoning on the question are often based upon faulty analysis or
suspect underlying case authority.45 Several courts merely avoid
the question entirely by stating that the plaintiff has failed to meet
even the lowest standard of proof.46
B. The Role and Significance of the Standard of Proof
The absence of clear congressional guidance, the inactivity of
the Supreme Court of the United States in deciding the issue, and
the irreconcilable conflict among the lower federal courts create a
situation whereby the issue of the appropriate standard of proof
required in an action to deny discharge pursuant to section 727(a)
is yet to be determined.47 The appropriate standard in a civil
action is either a preponderance of the evidence or clear and
convincing evidence.4" Given the importance of the discharge as
the primary benefit to most debtors in chapter 7 bankruptcy, this
issue is of the utmost significance to both debtor and creditor alike.
The determination of the appropriate standard of proof in a
discharge action pursuant to section 727(a) depends in part upon
44. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. 848, 851 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988). See, e.g., Farmers Co-
Operative Association of Talmage, Kansas v. Strunk, 671 F.2d 391, 395 (10th Cir. 1982) (stating
without any supporting rationale that proof of fraudulent concealment must be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to bar discharge).
45. See e.g., In re Booth, 70 Bankr. 391, 394 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (holding that the clear
and convincing standard is appropriate for actions to deny discharge under section 727 because of
the harsh ramifications of a successful action). See also infra note 187 and accompanying text
(discrediting the so-called harsh ramifications rationale).
46. See e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp v. Rebhan, 842 F.2d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 1988); In re
Phillips, 804 F.2d 930, 932 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Kimzey, 761 F.2d 421,423-24 (7th Cir. 1985); In
re Horldt, 86 Bankr. 823 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (avoiding the issue of the appropriate standard of proof by
stating that the plaintiff has failed to meet even the lowest standard).
47. In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315, 329 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988) (stating that in the absence of
congressional guidance, the lower federal courts are in irreconcilable conflict regarding the standard
of proof inquiry).
48. Id. at 318.
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the importance society places upon the bankruptcy discharge.49
The standard of proof reflects an assessment of the comparative
social costs of erroneous factual determinations." Thus, a standard
of proof represents an attempt to instruct the fact finder, who in a
discharge proceeding is the bankruptcy judge, concerning the
degree of confidence that society believes the judge should have in
the correctness of factual determinations for a particular type of
adjudication. 1 Although the phrases "preponderance of the
evidence" and "clear and convincing evidence" are qualitatively
ambiguous, these phrases communicate the different notions of the
degree of confidence the fact finder is expected to possess in the
correctness of factual conclusions.52 Accordingly, application of
the clear and convincing standard of proof to actions under section
727(a) instructs the bankruptcy judge that society affords a great
deal of importance to the discharge, thus requiring the judge to
possess a higher degree of confidence in his factual conclusions
than under application of the preponderance standard.53
C. Policy Considerations Inplicated by the Chapter 7 Discharge
Bankruptcy is an equitable proceeding.54 A bankruptcy case is
administered according to principles of fairness, as contrasted with
the strictly formulated rules of common law.55 The equitable role
of the bankruptcy court, coupled with the court's concern for
promoting substantive fairness, mandates that the court balance the
competing policy concerns of the debtor's fresh start and the
objecting creditor's interest in enforcing its legal rights in
determining denial of discharge issues." Therefore, in determining
the appropriate standard of proof under section 727, it is necessary
49. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 368, 369-72 (1970) (stating that the standard of proof reflects a





54. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
55. Id.
56. 1 COWANS, BANKRUPTcY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.1 (1989).
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to examine the competing policy concerns to be served by that
section.
One of the primary purposes of chapter 7 bankruptcy is to
provide the debtor with a fresh start.57 Discharge from bankruptcy
is a privilege that is granted to the honest but unfortunate
individual debtor who surrenders property for distribution to obtain
a fresh start in business and life.5" The discharge relieves the
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and
permits the debtor to start afresh, free from the insurmountable
obligations and responsibilities that resulted from prior financial
misfortunes.59 Given the importance of the discharge to the
debtor, in light of the policy that promotes the "fresh start," the
court must carefully scrutinize the debtor's behavior, and construe
objections to discharge strictly against the objecting creditor and
liberally in favor of the debtor, so as to insure that the fresh start
is not frustrated.60
The granting of a discharge is dependent upon a balancing of
the debtor's equitable interest in obtaining a fresh start and the
legal interests of the objecting creditor.6' In determining whether
the privilege of discharge is to be granted to a particular debtor, the
court must balance the underlying policy of providing the debtor
a fresh start with the policy of preventing a dishonest debtor from
using the bankruptcy laws to avoid the consequences of wrongful
conduct at the expense of the creditor.62  Discharge is
57. In re Levitan, 46 Bankr. 380, 383 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1985).
58. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315, 320
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1988).
59. Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 244.
60. See Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915); Caspers v. Van Home, 823 F.2d 1285,
1287 (8th Cir. 1987); Murphy & Robinson Investment Co. v. Cross, 666 F.2d 873, 879-80 (5th Cir.
1982); In re Vickers, 577 F.2d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 1978); Spach v. Strauss, 373 F.2d 641, 642-43
(5th Cir. 1967); In re Zidoff, 309 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1962); Bockus v. Yuen, 29 F.2d 205, 206
(9th Cir. 1928); In re Greene, 81 Bankr. 829, 833 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y 1988); In re Jenkins, 61 Bankr.
30,39 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1986); In re Materetsky, 28 Bankr. 499,502 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1986) (stating
that objections to discharge should be strictly construed against the objecting creditor and liberally
construed in favor of the debtor).
61. United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (implying that the fresh start policy
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appropriately denied to the debtor who engages in legally
reprehensible conduct, before or during bankruptcy, that is to the
disadvantage of creditors.63 Whatever strength the fresh start
policy may have, the policy may not outweigh an innocent
creditor's interest in obtaining redress for harm suffered as a result
of the debtor's behavior in violation of section 727(a). 6' The fresh
start policy must therefore be considered in light of the interests of
the creditor which Congress attempted to protect in enacting the
Code.6 '5
D. Analysis of Section 523 by Analogy
The Supreme Court of the United States and several federal
courts of appeal have examined the issue of the appropriate
standard of proof required for an exception to discharge under
section 523(a) of the Code.66 If an objecting creditor successfully
maintains an action under section 523, the debtor still receives a
discharge, however the particular debt owed to the objecting
creditor is excepted from that discharge. 7 In contrast, a successful
action under section 727(a) denies the debtor discharge of all
debts. 8 The severity of a successful action under section 727(a)
is clearly more adverse to the debtor than a successful action under
section 523(a).'
Although sections 727(a) and 523(a) differ substantially in
scope, several courts have found cases determining the applicable
63. Id.
64. Id. (Court observed that the fresh start policy may not outweigh specific policy judgments
made by Congress in enacting the exceptions to discharge).
65. 1 COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACCE § 6.2, at 691-92 (1989).
66. See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 111 5. Ct. 654,661 (1991); In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621,626
(3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 782 (1991) (applying the preponderance of the evidence
standard to section 523).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
68. Id. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
69. Compare id. (a successful action under section 727(a) completely denies the debtor from
discharge) with 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987) (a successful action under section 523(a)
merely excepts a single debt from discharge). If discharge is denied, the debtor remains liable for all
prepetition debts that the debtor incurred, thus frustrating the fresh start policy. 1 COWANS,
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACnCE § 5.1 (1989).
1214
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standard of proof under section 523(a) are useful by analogy in
determining the appropriate standard for an action under section
727(a).70 While decisions based upon the application of section
523(a) are useful by analogy in determining the appropriate
standard of proof required for an objection to discharge under
section 727(a), such an analogy is not controlling.7 As a result of
the difference between the severity of the two sections, a
determination that the standard of proof under section 727(a) is
appropriate solely because a decision under section 523(a) is well
reasoned is unsound.72 The differing consequences of successful
actions under the two sections prevent absolute application.73
However, the underlying rationale of several cases decided under
section 523(a) is sound, and may be applicable merely as a
consideration in determining the standard under section 727. For
instance, the Supreme Court of the United States recently held that
the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is applicable
to exception from discharge actions under section 523(a).74 This
decision is useful in determining the appropriate standard of proof
required in a section 727(a) objection.
I1. THE CASES
Most of the case authority dealing with the standard of proof
issue is from the various federal bankruptcy courts. This Comment
will next analyze several cases dealing with the issue of the
standard of proof under section 727(a) and under section 523(a).75
70. In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315, 318 (Bankr. D. VL 1988) (stating that courts can use cases
decided under section 523 to analogize the section 727 standard of proof requirement).
71. Id. The Mayo court cautioned that in analogizing to cases decided under section 523, it
should be clearly understood that causes of action under section 523 are dissimilar statutory creatures
from causes of action under section 727. Id. Whereas a successful action under section 727(a)
completely denies the debtor from discharge, a successful action under section 523 merely excepts
a single debt from discharge. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a), 727(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
72. In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. at 318.
73. Id.
74. Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 661 (1991) (holding that the appropriate standard of
proof for all actions to except a debt from discharge under section 523(a) is a preponderance of the
evidence).
75. See infra notes 77-141 and accompanying text.
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The discussion includes an analysis of the recent decision from the
Supreme Court of the United States holding that the appropriate
standard of proof for actions under section 523(a) is a
preponderance of the evidence.76
A. The Preponderance Standard
Courts applying the preponderance of the evidence standard
frequently subscribe to one of two theories. Some courts apply the
"silence of the Code" theory, reasoning that since the Code is
silent regarding the standard of proof, courts may not imply a
higher standard than the preponderance standard normally applied
in ordinary civil proceedings.77 Courts adopting this theory reason
that it is the role of Congress, rather than the courts, to determine
when a heightened standard of proof is required.78
Other courts determine the appropriate standard of proof by
ascertaining whether the underlying cause of action is founded
upon fraud.79 The clear and convincing standard is applied if
fraud is alleged;8" and if not, the lesser preponderance standard is
76. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., In re Kim, 97 Bankr. 275,279-81 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (applying the silence
of the Code theory in holding that the appropriate standard of proof under section 727(a)(3) is a
preponderance of the evidence).
78. IM
79. The underlying cause of action refers to the underlying activity that is addressed by the
relevant subsection of section 727. For instance, section 727(a)(2) denies discharge if the debtor
fraudulently transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed property of the estate or
property belonging to the debtor within twelve months preceding the filing. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)
(1982 & Supp. 1987). Thus, the underlying cause of action in an action under section 727(a)(2) is
based upon fraud. In contrast, failure to obey a lawful order of the court pursuant to section 727(a)(6)
in not a fraudulent activity, and thus the underlying cause of action is not based upon fraud, but
rather upon nonfeasance. Id. § 727(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
80. See In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315, 329 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988); (applying the fraud/nonfraud
distinction in determining that the appropriate standard is clear and convincing evidence).
1216
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applied."1 Further, some courts apply both the silence of the Code
and the fraud/nonfraud theories together.
8 2
Other courts have applied alternative rationales in determining
that the appropriate standard of proof is a preponderance of the
evidence. One court reached that conclusion by employing a
balancing test.83 Another court held that the preponderance
standard is appropriate by reasoning that the clear and convincing
standard is illogical.8 4 Each of those rationales will be further
explored below.
1. Grogan v. Garner: The Silence of the Code Theory
The Supreme Court of the United States recently held in
Grogan v. Garner85 that the appropriate standard of proof for all
actions to except debts from discharge pursuant to section 523(a)
is a preponderance of the evidence.8 6 The Court applied the
silence of the Code theory, holding that the statutory silence is
inconsistent with the view that Congress intended to require a
heightened standard of proof.8 7
The Court also reasoned that the preponderance standard results
in roughly equal allocation of risk among the litigants, and is
therefore applicable unless constitutionally recognized rights or
interests are at issue."8 The Court held that-since the debtor does
not have a fundamental right to discharge in bankruptcy, and since
discharge is not analogous to any of the recognized constitutional
81. See, e.g., In re Braen, 900 F.2d 621, 624-26 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied II1 S. Ct. 782
(1991); In re Kim, 97 Bankr. 275, 280-81 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (applying the fraud/nonfraud
distinction in determining that the appropriate standard is a preponderance of the evidence).
82. See ln re Kim, 97 Bankr. 275, 279-81 (Bankr. RD. Va. 1989) (applying the silence of the
Code and the fraudfnonfraud theories in determining that the appropriate standard of proof under
section 727(a) is a preponderance of the evidence).
83. See In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. 848, 854 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 1988).
84. See In re Stowell, 113 Bankr. 322, 331 (Bankr. W. D. Tex. 1990).
85. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
86. Id. at 661. Although the issue in Grogan concerned section 523(a) exception from
discharge, the reasoning may be applicable to determining the appropriate standard of proof under
section 727(a) denial of discharge. See supra notes 66 - 74 and accompanying text (discussing the
use of section 523(a) decisions by analogy).
87. Grogan, 111 S. Ct. at 659-60 (discussing the silence of the Code theory).
88. Id. at 659.
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rights that traditionally implicate a heightened standard of proof,
the preponderance standard is applicable to actions to except debts
from discharge.89
2. In re Stowell: Application of the Preponderance Standard
by Reasoning that the Clear and Convincing Standard is
Illogical
Prior to the Grogan decision, in the case of In re Stowell,' a
federal bankruptcy court concluded that the clear and convincing
standard is illogical in actions under section 523(a). That court
challenged two common maxims upon which courts frequently rely
upon in adopting the heightened standard.9 The Stowell court
acknowledged that several courts had held that exceptions to
discharge are to be literally and strictly construed against the
creditor and liberally, construed in favor of the debtor.' Those
courts held that in order to achieve this "prodebtor" construction,
the clear and convincing standard is necessary.93
The Stowell court also recognized that several courts reason that
the clear and convincing standard is required by the fresh start
policy of the Code.94 Those cases reason that because the public
policy underlying the Code favors a fresh start for the honest
debtor, any objections to this fresh start must be established with
89. Id. at 659-61.
90. 113 Bankr. 322, 331 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990). Although Stowell was a section 523 case,
the opinion offers useful insight as to why the court declined to adopt the clear and convincing
standard.
91. Id. at 331.
92. Id. at 330. See Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915); Caspers v. Van Home, 823
F.2d 1285,1287 (8th Cir. 1987) Murphy & Robinson Investment Co. v. Cross, 666 F.2d 873,879-80
(5th Cir. 1982); In re Vickers, 577 F.2d 683, 687 (10th Cir. 1978); Spach v. Strauss, 373 F.2d 641,
642-43 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Zidoff, 309 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1962); Bockus v. Yuen, 29 F.2d
205, 206 (9th Cir. 1928); In re Greene, 81 Bankr. 829, 833 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y 1988); In re Jenkins,
61 Bankr. 30, 39 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1986); In re Materetsky, 28 Bankr. 499, 502 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
1986) (stating that objections to discharge should be strictly construed against the objecting creditor
and liberally construed in favor of the debtor).
93. In re Stowell, 113 Bankr. at 330. This liberal construction is intended to protect the
debtor's fresh start. Id.
94. Id. See In re Booth, 70 Bankr. 391, 394 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1979) (holding that the clear and
convincing standard is required by the fresh start policy of the Code).
1218
1991/11 U.S.C. Section 727(a)
a heightened standard of proof, in order to protect the debtor's
interest in obtaining a fresh start."'
The Stowell court reasoned that application of these maxims
does not produce a logical result.96 The Stowell court referred
favorably to the case of In re Powell,97 wherein the court
reasoned that it is the very honesty of the debtor which is called
into question in section 523(a) dischargeability and section 727(a)
discharge cases, and the higher clear and convincing standard of
proof essentially presumes the very issue in question, namely the
debtor's honesty.
98
The privilege of discharge from bankruptcy is based upon
honest behavior by the debtor.99 If an objecting creditor brings an
action against the debtor for denial of discharge or to determine the
dischargeability of a given debt, the creditor is in effect calling the
debtor's honesty into question."° However, the clear and
convincing standard is so difficult to satisfy that such a standard
virtually creates a conclusive presumption of the debtor's
honesty.'' This presumption of honesty is not appropriate
because it tends to favor the dishonest debtor by making it more
difficult for the objecting creditor to prove that the debtor acted
dishonestly.0 2 In the alternative, the preponderance of the
evidence standard is sufficient to decisively establish the debtor's
dishonesty without the requirement of overcoming a presumption
95. See, e.g., In re Cook, 21 Bankr. 112,114 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1982) (holding that the clear
and convincing standard is required to protect the debtor's interest in obtaining a fresh start).
96. In re Stowell, 113 Bankr. at 330. The Stowell court based its reasoning on the opinion of
Judge Clark in the Texas case of In re Powell, 88 Bankr. 114, 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). Id.
97. 88 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
98. Srowell, 113 Bankr. at 330 (citing In re Powell, 88 Bankr. 114, 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1988)).
99. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315, 320
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1988).
100. In re Powell, 88 Bankr. at 118.
101. Id.
102. Id. The clear and convincing standard makes it more difficult for the objecting creditor
to prove that the debtor acted dishonestly, yet it is the debtor's honesty that is called into question
in an action pursuant to section 727(a). Id. Thus, it is contradictory to make the standard more
burdensome for an objecting creditor to prove the dubious honesty of the debtor. Id.
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in such actions.0 3 Thus, the Powell court reasoned that the
preponderance standard promotes a more measured and even-
handed review.1
The Stowell court agreed with the reasoning of the Powell court
in determining the appropriate standard of proof in actions under
section 523(a).'05 The Stowell court concluded that the analytical
underpinnings of the clear and convincing standard were not sound
when applied in such actions."° Thus, the court held that the
appropriate standard of proof in an action to deny discharge
pursuant to section 727(a) is a preponderance of the evidence.0 7
3. In re Watkins: A Balancing Test
The bankruptcy court in In re Watkins"°3 applied a balancing
test in holding that the appropriate standard of proof under section
523(a) is a preponderance of the evidence.1" The court stated
that to determine the requisite standard of proof, a court must
consider the type of action being litigated, the risks faced by the
defendant if the defendant should lose, and the interests the
plaintiff will enjoy if the plaintiff should prevail.110
The Watkins court stated that the requisite standard of proof is
a preponderance of the evidence unless the law places a
particularly strong value upon the privilege of discharge that would
103. In re Stowell, 113 Bankr. 322,331 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990). The Stowell court stated that
the preponderance of the evidence standard is mandated in light of the shaky analytical underpinnings
of the clear and convincing standard, particularly the creation of the presumption of the debtor's
honesty. Id.
104. Powell, 88 Bankr. at 118.
105. Stowell, 113 Bankr. at 331 (citing In re Powell, 88 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 90 Bankr. 848 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
109. Id. at 855. Although the Watkins decision has been superseded by the recent Supreme
Court decision in Grogan v. Garner, the rationale remains valuable in determining the appropriate
standard of proof under section 727(a). See Grogan v. Garner, 11I S. Ct. 654 (1991).
110. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 854. This test requires the bankruptcy judge to balance the
interests of the parties in light of the issue at hand. Id.
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require a greater burden to be imposed upon the objecting
party."' The court held that certain rights demand greater
protection than do other rights."' Deprivation of one of these
protected rights requires proof by a heightened standard.
113
The ultimate example of a constitutionally protected right is the
right to liberty, best illustrated by the right to remain free from
imprisonment. 14 This right is deemed so important that it may
only be lost by a criminal defendant upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of all substantive elements of a crime. 15 The
Watkins court also cited a number of rights which may only be
deprived upon proof by clear and convincing evidence." 6 These
include the right not to be deported," 7 the right not to be stripped
of one's U.S. citizenship,' and the right to free speech.'19
The Watkins court asserted that on the other end of the
continuum is the typical civil case that involves a monetary dispute
S111. Id. at 855. Thus, the question is essentially the degree of importance that the law affords
to the bankruptcy discharge, in light of the degree of importance of other legal rights that are
subjected to the clear and convincing standard. Id.
112. Id. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2856 (1990)
(holding that the clear and convincing standard is appropriate to determine the termination of
nutrition and hydration of a person in a persistent vegetative state); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-
72 (1970) (holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is appropriate to determine the right
to remain free from imprisonment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,286 (1966) (holding that the clear
and convincing standard is appropriate to determine the right not to be deported); New York Times
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,285-86 (1964) (holding that a public official who sues the media for libel
must prove allegations by clear and convincing evidence); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350,
353 (1960) (holding that the clear and convincing standard is appropriate to determine the right to
citizenship).
113. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 855. Rights that are afforded greater protection may only be
deprived upon a showing of clear and convincing proof. Id.
114. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (holding that the prosecution in a criminal
trial must prove all elements of the alleged offense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
115. Id.
116. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 855.
117. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,286 (1966) (holding that the clear and convincing standard
is appropriate in denaturalization proceedings).
118. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350,353 (1960) (holding that the clear and convincing
standard is appropriate to revoke a person's U.S. citizenship).
119. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (holding that a public
official who sues the media for libel must prove allegations by clear and convincing evidence).
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between private parties.12 ° These actions involve controversies
affecting economic interests rather than controversies affecting
liberty interests."' Since society has a minimal concern with the
outcome of such private monetary disagreements, the plaintiff's
standard of proof is merely a preponderance of the evidence."
This standard places the litigants in a position whereby they share
the risk of error in roughly an equal fashion."z
The court concluded that an action for nondischargeability is
analogous to the claims in the economic rights category rather than
the liberty rights category. 24 If a debtor is denied discharge, or
a particular debt is excepted from discharge, all the debtor loses is
the right to not pay a debt that was voluntarily incurred."z The
sole rights of the parties are economic: if discharge is denied, the
debtor merely remains subject to the same risks and burdens of any
other debtor outside bankruptcy.' 6 If the discharge is granted, the
creditor merely loses any right to collect a previously owed
debt.' 27 Thus, the court in Watkins held that given the balancing
of the interests of the parties, and in light of the type of action at
issue, no sound reason exists to require a heightened standard of
proof under section 523(a).1
28
120. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 856. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
a bankruptcy debtor does not have a constitutional right to obtain a discharge. United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434,445-46 (1973). Thus, the debtor's interest in obtaining a discharge is analogous to the
typical civil action involving a monetary dispute between two private parties.
121. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 856. The typical civil suit is based solely upon monetary
disputes that do not involve allegations of constitutional liberty violations. Id.
122. Id. The corollary is that if society has a strong concern with the outcome of a case
involving rights other than mere monetary disputes, the clear and convincing standard is mandated.
Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The focus of the bankruptcy discharge is to economically rehabilitate the honest but
unfortunate debtor. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934); In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315,
320 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988).
125. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 856. The denial of discharge only affects the debtor's
economic rights, with no effect on any of the debtor's constitutionally protected liberty rights. Id.
126. Id. If discharge is denied, the primary consequence is that the debtor remains liable for
debts voluntarily incurred prior to filing for bankruptcy protection. Id.
127. Id. The granting of a discharge only affects the creditor's economic interest in receiving
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4. In re Braen: The Fraud/Nonfraud Distinction
In In re Braen,'29 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the standard of proof should be determined by examining
whether or not the underlying action is based upon fraud. 3 This
fraud/nonfraud theory suggests that if the underlying cause of
action is not based upon fraud, the objecting creditor need only
satisfy the preponderance standard."' The corollary is that if the
underlying cause of action is fraudulent in nature, the movant must
prove the allegations by clear and convincing evidence.' This
theory comports with the traditional common law notion that
allegations of fraud had to be established by a heightened standard
of proof, because a successful action has the potential of tarnishing
the defendant's reputation of honesty and fair dealing. 33 The
Braen court held that the appropriate standard of proof is the
prevailing standard used by courts to resolve the types of claims
underlying the particular exceptions at issue. 13 Thus, the Braen
decision stands for the proposition that in determining the requisite
standard of proof, it is necessary to examine the underlying claim,
and determine the standard of proof that would be required by that
claim in an ordinary civil action.'35 Thus, in Braen, the objecting
creditor was merely required to prove his claim of willful and
malicious injury by a preponderance of the evidence, since that tort
does not constitute an act of fraud.
36
129. 900 F.2d 621 (3rd Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 782 (1991).
130. Id at 624-26.
131. Id. at 625.
132. See In re Kim, 97 Bankr. 275,281 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that for purposes of
fraudulent intent or fraud claims, the correct burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence,
however, where fraud is not alleged, the correct burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence).
133. See Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358,362-63 (1929); Lalone v. United States, 164 U.S. 255,
257-58 (1896); Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. of Education 493 F.2d 1016, 1019 (4th Cir.
1974); Holley Coal Co. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 186 F.2d 291,296 (4th Cir. 1950) (stating that over
the years a rule has evolved where one who charges fraud must prove the fraud by clear and
convincing evidence).
134. In re Braen, 900 F.2d at 625-26.
135. Id.
136. Id at 626.
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5. In re Kim: The Fraud/Nonfraud Distinction and the Silence
of the Code Theory Applied Together
One decision that applies both the fraud/nonfraud distinction
and the silence of the Code theory is In re Kim.137 The Kim court
first based its holding on the silence of the Code reasoning, holding
that in the face of statutory silence courts may not impose a higher
standard than normally applied in ordinary civil proceedings.
138
However, the court took the analysis one step further and examined
the underlying cause of action. 39 In holding that an action for
failure to maintain adequate financial records pursuant to section
727(a)(3) is not akin to fraud, the Kim court declared that the
correct standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence for
claims based upon fraud or fraudulent intent; however, if fraud is
not alleged, then the correct standard is preponderance of the
evidence."4 The court then held that because fraud was not
alleged, the appropriate standard of proof was a preponderance of
the evidence.
141
B. The Clear and Convincing Standard
Generally, courts applying the clear and convincing standard in
actions under section 727(a) utilize three theories to justify their
decisions. Several courts hold that because of the harsh
consequences of a successful action under section 727, a
heightened standard of proof is required to justify denying a debtor
the privilege of discharge. 142 Other courts place great emphasis
on the fact that the underlying policy of discharge is to provide the
honest debtor with a fresh start, and any action that may impede
137. 97 Bankr. 275 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989).
138. Id. at 281.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 280-81.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315, 329 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988); In re Booth, 70 Bankr.
391,394 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (holding that the severe effects of a successful action under section
727 mandates application of the clear and convincing standard).
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this goal must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 143 At
least one other court applied the fraud/nonfmud distinction,
44
reasoning that if the underlying cause of action is based upon
fraud, then the clear and convincing standard is required, as in
ordinary civil actions for fraud at common law. As shown in the
above section dealing with the preponderance of the evidence
standard, this fraud/nonfraud distinction is also utilized in
determining the applicability of that standard. 145
1. In re Mayo: Harsh Consequences and the FraudNonfraud
Distinction
In the case of In re Mayo, 146 a Vermont federal bankruptcy
court recently held that clear and convincing evidence, rather than
mere preponderance of the evidence, is the appropriate standard of
proof when a creditor objects to a debtor's discharge under section
727(a). 47 The plaintiff sued the debtor under sections 727(a) and
523(a), however, the court only addressed the issue of the
appropriate standard of proof under section 727(a)."4 ' In
determining that the clear and convincing standard is applicable to
section 727(a)(3), which denies discharge for failure by the debtor
to maintain adequate financial records, 149 the Mayo court relied
in part on the 1929 Supreme Court decision of Oriel v. Russell.'5"
143. See, e.g., In re Booth, 70 Bankr. at 394 (holding that the significance of the fresh start
policy is one reason to apply the clear and convincing standard to an action under section 727).
144. See, e.g., In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. at 329 (holding that the clear and convincing standard
is appropriate if the underlying action in the dischargeability proceeding is based upon fraud).
145. See supra notes 79 - 82 and accompanying text (discussing the fraud/nonfraud distinction
in applying the preponderance of the evidence standard).
146. 94 Bankr. 315 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988).
147. In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. at 318.
148. Id. at 315. In Mayo, the issue of the appropriate standard of proof was first raised at the
pretrial conference. Id. at 318. Neither party to the litigation objected to the court's pronouncement
that the appropriate standard under section 523 was clear and convincing evidence. Id. Thus, the sole
issue for determination at trial was the appropriate standard of proof in an action under section 727.
Id.
149. 1 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
150. Mayo, 94 Bankr. at 315 (citing Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929)). Oiel involved a
debtor who refused to produce various books of account pursuant to an order to turnover. Oiel, 278
U.S. at 361. As a result, the debtor was held in contempt of court. Id. Although the debtor appealed
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In Oriel, a case decided prior to enactment of the Code, the Court
held that in an action for turn over" of accounting records, the
clear and convincing standard is appropriate.
152
The Mayo court maintained that Oriel was analogous because
a 1929 turnover proceeding is akin to a modem section 727(a)(3)
proceeding. 153 The Oriel Court reasoned that the failure to deliver
accounting records is analogous to fraud, in that the debtor knew
he was obligated to deliver the records to the trustee, but
deliberately refused to comply with that obligation.154 The Oriel
Court then held that such failure must be proven to the same extent
as required in a civil action for fraud.
155
The Mayo court also reasoned that the requirement of the
heightened standard of proof is further compelled by the harsh
consequences of a successful objection under section 727(a)(3), as
compared to a successful action under section 523(a).1 56 Whereas
a successful action under section 523(a) merely excepts a single
debt from discharge, 157 a successful action under section 727(a)
on the contempt issue, Chief Justice Taft, writing for the majority, addressed the issue of the requisite
standard of proof applicable to the order to turnover. Id. at 361-62. The majority opinion in Oriel
rejected the preponderance of the evidence standard and held that a proceeding to turn over in
bankruptcy is a charge equivalent to fraud, and must be established by the same kind of evidence
required in a case of fraud, namely clear and convincing evidence. Id.
151. A turnover proceeding is an action where the plaintiff requests judicial intervention to
cause the defendant to surrender the articles in question to the plaintiff. Oriel, 278 U.S. at 361.
152. Id. at 362.
153. In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. at 325. Section 727(a)(3) states in relevant part: "'The court shall
grant the debtor a discharge, unless... the debtor has concealed ... any recorded information,
including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor's financial condition or
business transactions might be ascertained." 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1987). The
concealment of recorded information contemplated by section 727(a)(3) is analogous to the
defendant's refusal to surrender articles subject to a turnover proceeding. In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. at
325.
154. Oriel, 278 U.S. at 362-63. The fraud arose because the debtor had knowledge that he was
required to deliver the records to the bankruptcy trustees, but expressly refused to do so. Id.
155. Id.
156. In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. at 329. In Mayo, the court stated that 'A section 727
nondischargeability complaint is a cataclysmic attack on a debtor's fresh start. The successful result
of such an attack is to deprive the debtor of his entire fresh start. Compared to the
nondisehargeability result of a successful section 523(a) attack, a successful section 727 proceeding
is the equivalent of all out nuclear war on the debtor." Id.
157. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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completely denies the debtor discharge. 158 The court held that the
harsh effect of a successful action under section 727(a) mandates
the heightened standard of proof.159 The Mayo court, in applying
both the fraud/nonfraud distinction and the harsh consequences
theory, held that the requisite standard of proof in an action to deny
discharge under section 727(a) is clear and convincing
evidence."6
2. In re Booth: Harsh Consequences and the Fresh Start
In In re Booth,"" a Colorado federal bankruptcy court held
that a party objecting to a debtor's discharge must prove its
allegations by clear and convincing evidence. 62 The Court
reasoned that an attack on discharge under section 727(a) is
significantly more severe in its consequences than excepting a
single debt from discharge under section 523(a). 63 The court held
that this severity, coupled with the policy of providing the debtor
with a fresh start, mandates application of the clear and convincing
standard. 64 Thus, the Booth court relied on both the harsh
consequences theory and the fresh start theory in reaching its
decision. 165
158. Id. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
159. Mayo, 94 Bankr. at 329. The court stated that the denial of discharge is a particularly
severe remedy because it precludes the debtor from obtaining any relief from creditors at the
conclusion of the bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
160. Id. at 328-29. In stating its holding, the court noted the absence of any congressional
guidance and the unreconcilable conflict among the cases dealing with the standard of proof issue
under section 727. Id.
161. 70 Bankr. 391 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987).
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE THEORIES: APPLICATION
OF A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF PROOF IS
NOT VERY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
The function of a standard of proof is to inform the finder of
fact regarding the degree of confidence that he or she should
possess in the correctness of the particular factual conclusion at
issue." Thus, the choice of a particular standard of proof reflects
the importance of the interests at stake. 7 The Supreme Court of
the United States has recognized that a heightened standard of
proof is mandated when the interests at stake are both "particularly
important" and "more substantial than [the] mere loss of
money." 168  These important issues generally deal with
fundamental constitutional rights.
6 9
The Supreme Court has held that the imposition of even the
most severe civil sanctions will be permitted based upon proof by
a mere preponderance of the evidence, so long as "important"
interests are not implicated.' Society has a minimal concern
with the outcome of the typical civil action involving a monetary
dispute between two parties that does not implicate fundamental
constitutional rights.17 ' Accordingly, the Court has held that the
plaintiff's standard of proof in such an action is generally the
preponderance of the evidence standard. 71 In fact, the standard
of proof imposed in the majority of nonbankruptcy civil actions
dealing with economic disputes is a preponderance of the
evidence. 7 This includes ordinary civil actions in fraud.174
166. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
167. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. 848, 855 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
168. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) The Supreme Court has applied the
heightened clear and convincing standard of proof in several nonbankruptcy cases. See supra note
112 and accompanying text (discussing other factual situations in which the Court has imposed the
clear and convincing standard).
169. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 756.
170. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983).
171. Id.
172. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (holding that the clear and convincing
standard is appropriate in an action for civil commitment).
173. Id at 423 (stating that the preponderance of the evidence standard is imposed in the
ordinary civil suit for money damages).
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Further, a number of nonbankruptcy federal laws permit proof of
fraud by a mere preponderance of the evidence.1 75 Included in
this category are the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.
176
The Supreme Court has held that the debtor's interest in
obtaining a discharge is not a fundamental interest or
constitutionally guaranteed right. 177  An action to deny the
debtor's discharge is essentially a monetary dispute between two
parties. 178  The characterization of the discharge is muddled,
however, because the fresh start policy of the Code has been
viewed to mandate application of section 727(a) with a prodebtor
disposition. 179
The innocent creditor's interest in obtaining compensation for
the debtor's violation of section 727(a) is however at least as
important as the debtor's interest in obtaining a fresh start.8 °
Further, given the Supreme Court's reluctance to apply the clear
and convincing standard to civil suits solely involving monetary
174. See infra notes 183-186 and accompanying text (discussing the emerging majority view
that the appropriate standard of proof in an ordinary civil action in fraud is a preponderance of the
evidence).
175. Congress and the Supreme Court have decided that the preponderance of the evidence
standard is appropriate in a number of federally created substantive causes of action for fraud. See
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-92 (1983) (civil enforcement of the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws); Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 450 U.S. 91,
96 (1981) (administrative proceedings concerning violation of antifraud provisions of the securities
laws); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943)
(section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933); First National Monetary Corp. v. Weinberger, 819 F.2d
1334, 1341-42 (6th Cir. 1987) (civil fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act); 12 U.S.C.§
1833a(e) (1986 & Supp. 1990) (civil penalties for fraud involving financial institutions); 31 U.S.C.
§ 373 1(c) (1986 & Supp. 1990) (False Claims Act); 42 C.F.R. § 1003.114(a) (1989) (Medicare and
Medicaid fraud under 42 U.S.C. section 1320a-7a).
176. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (holding that the
preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable to a private action under section 10(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.,
320 U.S. 344, 355 (1943) (holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable to
an action pursuant to section 17(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933).
177. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,445-46 (1973) (stating that the debtor does not have
a constitutional right to discharge and that no fundamental interest is gained or lost depending on the
availability of a bankruptcy discharge).
178. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. 848, 856 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
179. In re Huff, I Bankr. 354, 356-57 (Bankr. D. Utah 1979).
180. Id.
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damages, the balance of the interests among the parties involved in
the discharge litigation appears to be evenly balanced in that
whichever party loses, the loss suffered is solely economic.1"1
Given that the interests of the debtor and creditor are merely
economic, as in any ordinary civil action, and given that the
discharge does not implicate any important societal interest that the
Court has traditionally protected with heightened scrutiny,
application of the clear and convincing standard in discharge
actions is not justified in light of the traditional types of actions
that have utilized the heightened standard.8 2
In addition, a majority of the states, including California, hold
that the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate
standard of proof in a civil action for fraud.1"3 This emerging
181. Id.
182. In re Watkins, 90 Bankr. at 855-56.
183. Calhoun v. Baylor, 646 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying Tennessee law)
(holding that Tennessee law requires only that fraud be proved by a preponderance of the evidence);
L & S Enterprises Co. v. Great American Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 457, 460 (7th Cir. 1971) (diversity
action applying Illinois law holding that fraud need only be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence); Powerhouse, Inc. v. Walton, 557 So. 2d 186, 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
the quantum of proof necessary to support an action for fraud is preponderance of the evidence);
LaCaze v. State, 541 So. 2d 322, 328 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that fraud need only be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence and it may be established by circumstantial evidence); Dairy
Queen v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 748 P.2d 1169,1171-72 (Alaska 1988) (holding that no more than
a preponderance of the evidence is necessary to establish fraud); Tipp v. United Bank of Durango,
Colorado, 23 Ark. App. 176, 178, 745 S.W.2d 141, 143 (1988) (holding that the party who alleges
fraud bears the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence); Parke County v. Ropak,
Inc., 526 N.E.2d 732, 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that fraud must only be proved by the
preponderance of the evidence); Ostalkiewicz v. Guardian Alarm, 520 A.2d 563, 569 (R.I. 1987)
(holding that fraud in a civil suit need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence); Tobin
v. Flynn & Larsen Implement Co., 220 Neb. 259,261,369 N.W.2d 96,99 (1985) (holding that fraud
suits at law must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence); General Elce. Credit Corp. v.
Wolverine Ins., 420 Mich. 176, 181, 362 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1984) (holding that fraud must be
established by a preponderance of the evidence); Poulsen v. Treasure State Industries, Inc., 192 Mont.
69, 626 P.2d 822 (1981) (holding that fraud can never be presumed, but must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence); Jennings v. Jennings, 309 N.W.2d 809, 812 (S.D. 1981) (holding
that fraud must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence); Liodas v. Sahadi, 19 Cal. 3d 278,
291, 562 P.2d 316, 324, 137 Cal. Rptr. 635, 643 (1977) (holding that civil fraud must only be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence); Goodfellow v. Kattnig, 533 P.2d 58, 60 (Colo. 1975) (holding
that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in all civil actions); Kern v. NCD Industries
Inc., 316 A.2d 576 (Del. 1973) (holding that fraud must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence); Echols v. N.C. Ribble Co., 85 N.M. 240, 244, 511 P.2d 566, 571 (1973) (holding that
fraud is proved by a preponderance of the evidence); Crawford v. Smith, 470 S.W.2d 529, 531-32
(Mo. 1971) (holding that fraud is proved by a preponderance of the evidence); Manning v. Len
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majority view contradicts the rationale of several of the cases
discussed above applying the clear and convincing standard in
discharge actions by reasoning that the standard of proof in an
ordinary civil action for fraud is clear and convincing
evidence. 114
The traditional reasons for applying the clear and convincing
standard to issues of fraud are inapplicable in modem
jurisprudence. Historically, the clear and convincing standard was
applied in civil proceedings involving allegations of fraud where a
written instrument failed to comply with the Statute of Frauds, the
Statute of Wills, or the parol evidence rule." 5 The courts applied
the clear and convincing standard in those cases because of the
potential that such claims were fabricated.186
Concerns of document fabrication are generally not implicated
in actions under section 727(a). In most discharge actions, the
validity of a written document is not in issue. Therefore, the
traditional common law rationale for requiring the clear and
convincing standard in civil actions for fraud is not applicable in
the discharge context. Further, in light of the emerging majority
view applying the preponderance of the evidence standard to civil
actions for fraud, the rationale for applying the clear and
convincing standard in discharge actions is no longer valid.
Immke Buick, Inc., 28 Ohio App. 2d 203, 276 N.E.2d 253, 257 (1971) (holding that the degree of
proof necessary to show fraud in a civil action for damages is by a preponderance of the evidence);
Medivox Productions, Inc. v. Hoffman-LaRouche, Inc., 107 NJ. Super. 47,256 A.2d 803,814 (1969)
(holding that fraud is determined in actions at law by a preponderance of the evidence); Frankfurt
v. Wilson, 353 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961) (holding that the burden of proof on the part
of the plaintiff to establish fraud is by a preponderance of the evidence); Maynard v. Durham &
Southern Railway Co., 251 N.C. 783,786, 112 S.E.2d 249,252 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365
U.S. 160 (1961) (holding that in an action to set aside an instrument based upon fraud, the burden
of proof to establish such allegation is by the preponderance of evidence). In addition, several
scholars argue that the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard of proof
in civil actions alleging fraud. See 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 468 (1968); 37 CJ.S. Fraud
§ 94, 113 (1943); Annotation, Quantum of Proof in Civil Case on Issue Involving Fraudulent,
Dishonest, or Criminal Misappropriation of Property, 62 A.LR. FED. 1449 (1929).
184. See In re Mayo, 94 Bankr. 315, 328 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1988).
185. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388 n.27 (1983).
186. Note, Appellate Review in the Federal Courts of Findings Requiring More than a
Preponderance of the Evidence, 60 HARV. L Rv. 111, 112 (1946) (discussing the reasons for
applying the clear and convincing standard of proof in common law actions for fraud).
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The harsh consequences rationale is also not convincing. The
fact that a successful action to deny discharge pursuant to section
727(a) produces harsh consequences in relation to a successful
action to except a debt from discharge pursuant to section 523(a)
is not sufficiently compelling to mandate imposition of a
heightened standard of proof. It is clear that a debtor will suffer
repercussions of a greater magnitude if discharge is denied than if
a single debt is merely excepted from discharge. However, these
heightened ramifications are purely of economic significance: the
effect of a denial of discharge is that the debtor remains liable
upon all prepetition debts. If discharge is denied, the debtor loses
monetarily. Yet, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
issues relating solely to economic interests are not sufficiently
important to warrant application of a heightened standard of
proof.1 7 The Court has refused to apply the clear and convincing
standard to issues solely involving monetary disputes. Therefore,
in light of the Court's treatment of monetary disputes, the harsh
economic consequences of a successful action under section 727(a)
are not sufficient to justify imposition of the clear and convincing
standard of proof.
The argument that the clear and convincing standard is
mandated by the fresh start policy underlying the discharge is also
not compelling. The fresh start that discharge contemplates is a
financial fresh start. The honest debtor is relieved from the
insurmountable indebtedness and is permitted to start afresh,
unrestrained by the obligations that resulted from prebankruptcy
financial misfortunes. The only interests that are affected by the
fresh start are purely economic. Thus, the fresh start, although
important as economic protection for the debtor, is not sufficiently
compelling to mandate a standard of proof greater than a mere
preponderance of the evidence.188
187. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing situations where a heightened
standard of proof is imposed).
188. The Supreme Court recently rejected the fresh start theory in the context of section 523.
Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 659 (1991). The Court held that the fresh start is limited to the
honest but unfortunate debtor, and that the interest of a perpetrator of fraud in obtaining a completo
discharge should not prevail over the interest in protecting victims of fraud. Id.
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Imposition of the clear and convincing standard would cause
discrepancy in application of issue preclusion procedures. The
effect of a nonbankruptcy court judgment that was rendered prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition is often an issue in a
bankruptcy discharge proceeding.189  The res judicata and
collateral estoppel effect of a prepetition nonbankruptcy court
judgment is thus an important consideration in determining the
appropriate standard of proof.1
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates
that the Bankruptcy Code takes precedence over conflicting state
laws and proceedings. 9 ' By express terms of the Constitution,
bankruptcy law is federal law."9 Yet, prior to 1970, the state
courts had jurisdiction to determine dischargeability issues.193
However, because of abuses precipitated by overzealous creditors
which effectively undermined the impact of the debtor's discharge,
and in an effort to promote uniformity in application of the Code,
Congress amended the Code, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the
bankruptcy courts over issues of dischargeability.1 94
In light of the exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts over issues relating to discharge, the Supreme Court held in
Brown v. Felsen195  that res judicata does not apply in
dischargeability proceedings.'96 The Court in Brown stressed that
the purposes behind granting the bankruptcy courts exclusive
jurisdiction over dischargeability proceedings would be frustrated
189. 1 CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.11 (1989). For example, the pre-
petition judgment may have concerned litigation by a creditor against the debtor on the basis of a
contract dispute involving fraud that would necessarily be nondisehargeable in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Id.
190. Id.
191. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,643-54 (1971) (discussing
the effects of the supremacy clause in causing the Bankruptcy Code to take precedence over
conflicting state laws).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
193. In re Huff, 1 Bankr. 354, 356 (Bankr. D. Utah 1979).
194. See S. RE'. No. 91-1173,91st Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 16, 1970); House Judiciary Comm.,
H. R. DOc. No. 91-1502, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONe. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4156 (discussing
the reasons for granting exclusive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts regarding issues of
dischargeability).
195. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
196. Id. at 138-39.
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by applying res judicata to a state court judgment.1" The Court
stated that the primary purpose of granting such exclusive
jurisdiction is to eliminate the abuses that were caused by creditors'
utilization of postbankruptcy state court collection actions to
resolve questions relating to dischargeability issues.198 Therefore,
the res judicata effect of a prior nonbankruptcy judgment is not
applicable in a bankruptcy ourt.99
Although application of res judicata is inconsistent with the
exclusive jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy courts, application of
collateral estoppel in determining issues relating to discharge is not
inconsistent with such exclusive jurisdiction.2 "°  Collateral
estoppel is an equitable doctrine, based upon the principle that
litigants and courts should not be subjected to relitigation of factual
issues that were fully adjudicated in another court of competent
jurisdiction.01 The underlying policy of collateral estoppel is to
promote judicial economy in the already overburdened judicial
system.
202
There are three requirements for application of collateral
estoppel of a prior court factual determination in a subsequent
adjudication. 2 3 First, the precise factual issue sought to be
litigated in the second court must be identical to the issue
previously litigated in the prior court.20 4 Second, the issue must
197. Id. at 136.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 1 CowANs, BANKRUPrCY LAW AND PRACICE § 6.11 (1989). The Supreme Court recently
held that collateral estoppel principles are applicable in discharge exception proceedings pursuant to
section 523(a). Grogan v. Garner, 111 S. Ct. 654, 658-59 (1991).
201. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (stating that collateral estoppel
has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical factual issue
with the same party and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation).
202. Id.
203. See In re Ross, 602 F.2d 604,608-09 (3rd Cir. 1979); In re Merrill, 594 F.2d 1064,1066-
67 (5th Cir. 1979); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF JuDMmENTs § 27 (1982) (discussing the three
requirements for application of collateral estoppel). Traditionally, there was a fourth requirement of
mutuality. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). The mutuality requirement
mandated that the same parties had to be involved in both the prior proceeding and the current
proceeding. Id. Mutuality is no longer required in most circumstances. Id.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF JUDG MENTs § 27 (1982).
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have been actually litigated in the prior adjudication. 5 Third, the
factual determination in the prior court adjudication must have been
critical and necessary to the outcome of the case.2 °' The burden
is on the moving party to establish these three requirements.2 7
The bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over the legal
issues relating to discharge does not mean that the underlying facts
are so sacrosanct that only the bankruptcy court may resolve
them. 28 Indeed, the Court in Brown v. Felsen specifically left
open the possibility that the collateral estoppel effect of a
nonbankruptcy court determination of a factual issue may be
applicable in a bankruptcy court.2°' Accordingly, a number of
federal courts of appeal have held that collateral estoppel is
applicable in discharge and dischargeability proceedings.210
Application of collateral estoppel of a prior nonbankruptcy
court determination in a discharge proceeding imposes one
additional requirement to the three common law requirements of
collateral estoppel.2" The nonbankruptcy court that adjudicated
the prior factual determination must have applied the same
standards which are applied in the bankruptcy court.212 In other
words, the standard of proof applied by the nonbankruptcy court in
205. Id. A default judgment does not fulfill the requirement of "actually litigated," and
collateral estoppel does not apply to such a judgment. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Hale, 618
F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir. 1980); Matter of McMillan, 579 F.2d 289, 293 (3rd Cir. 1978). Consent
judgments and stipulations will only be given collateral estoppel effect if it can be said that the
parties could reasonably have foreseen the conclusive effect of their actions. Kaspar Wire Works, Inc.
v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., 575 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1978).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
207. See New Equity Security Holders Committee for Golden Gulf, Ltd. v. Phillips, 97 Bankr.
492, 495 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1989); Folsom v. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of
Chicago, 633 F. Supp. 178, 181 (N.D. Il1. 1986) (stating that the movant bears the burden of
establishing the requirements of collateral estoppel).
208. Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388, 391-92 (1929) (holding that a prior
state court judgment that a patent holder held the patent for the benefit of another has collateral
estoppel effect in a federal patent infringement suit brought by the patent holder).
209. Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 139, n. 10 (1979).
210. See In re Wallace, 840 F.2d 762, 764-65 (10th Cir. 1988); Klingman v. Levinson, 831
F.2d 1292, 1295 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Latch, 820 F.2d 1163, 1166 (11 th Cir. 1987); In re Ross, 602
F.2d 604,607 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Allman, 735 F.2d 863,864 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1086 (1984); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 228 (6th Cir. 1981).
211. In re Supple, 14 Bankr. 898, 904 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (stating that the standards
employed by a state court in making its factual determination must comport with federal standards).
212. Id.
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determining the factual issue in question must be tantamount to the
standard of proof that the bankruptcy court is to apply.213
Factual issues in most civil actions are subject to the
preponderance of the evidence standard, and imposition of the clear
and convincing standard in discharge proceedings under section
727(a) will preclude application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel in most instances because doing so would violate the
requirement that the standards of proof be the same in both
courts.214 The result will be to impose significant additional
burdens on the litigants as well as the already overburdened
bankruptcy courts, by causing the bankruptcy courts to relitigate
issues that have already been determined in state courts, thus
undermining the policy of encouraging judicial economy.215 In
every instance where the initial nonbankruptcy judgment is
obtained pursuant to the preponderance of the evidence standard,
the entire action will have to be retried in the bankruptcy court
applying the clear and convincing standard.2"6
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts are not in agreement as to the appropriate standard
of proof required for a denial of discharge under section 727(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code. The Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue and the various federal bankruptcy and appellate courts do
not agree whether the appropriate standard is a preponderance of
the evidence or clear and convincing evidence. There is persuasive
authority in support of both standards.
213. Id.
214. In re Supple, 14 Bankr. 898,904 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (holding that collateral estoppel
may only be applied to a nonbankruptcy court judgment if the standards employed by the
nonbankruptcy court in reaching its decision comport with federal standards).
215. See Parldane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) (stating that the policies of
collateral estoppel are to prevent against relitigation of identical issues by identical parties and to
promote judicial economy). The policies of collateral estoppel will be frustrated in this situation
because the parties in the non-bankruptcy court litigation will be required to relitigate the issue of
fraud in the bankruptcy court dischargeability proceeding. In re Supple, 14 Bankr. at 904.
216. In re Supple, 14 Bankr. at 904 (discussing concerns of judicial economy in the context
of collateral estoppel application in bankruptcy discharge litigation).
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The most common rationale is the fraud/nonfraud distinction.
According to this theory, the clear and convincing standard is
appropriate if the underlying cause of action is based upon fraud.
Otherwise the preponderance of the evidence standard is
appropriate. This theory is based upon the fact that'at common law
allegations of fraud were required to be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. The fraud/nonfraud distinction is not sound
in the modern legal arena. The rationale for applying the clear and
convincing standard for allegations of fraud is not applicable in the
bankruptcy discharge context in that document fabrication, the
common justification for the heightened standard in civil actions
for fraud, is not a concern in discharge proceedings. Further, a
majority of state jurisdictions, including California, currently
specify that the appropriate standard of proof in civil actions for
fraud is a preponderance of the evidence.
Additionally, imposition of the clear and convincing standard
in actions pursuant to section 727(a) reduces judicial economy. A
bankruptcy court lying within a jurisdiction that requires proof of
the underlying claim by a preponderance of the evidence would
preclude application of collateral estoppel of a prior nonbankruptcy
court judgment, and would impose great burdens on the already
overburdened bankruptcy court system. The result is that the entire
issue would have to be relitigated in the bankruptcy court.
The fresh start rationale similarly does not support application
of a heightened standard of proof. The fresh start that discharge
contemplates is a financial fresh start, and the Supreme Court has
consistently held that issues involvingpure financial interests are
to be subjected only to the preponderance of the evidence standard.
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that the fresh start theory
is invalid in actions to except debts from discharge pursuant to
section 523(a).
The argument that the harsh consequences imposed by a
successful action pursuant to section 727(a), as compared to an
action pursuant to section 523(a), mandates application of the clear
and convincing standard is similarly not compelling. It is conceded
that the ramifications of a successful action to deny discharge are
significantly more severe to the debtor than a successful action to
1237
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 22
merely except a single debt from discharge. However, these harsh
consequences relate solely to economic implications. Issues relating
solely to economic interests are only subjected to the
preponderance of the evidence standard.
Application of the clear and convincing standard in
nonbankruptcy contexts has been limited by the Supreme Court to
actions dealing with fundamental constitutional rights and issues
that interfere with liberty.217 The debtor's interest in obtaining a
discharge is purely economic, as is the creditor's competing interest
in denying the debtor's discharge. Further, the Court has held that
the debtor's interest in obtaining a discharge is not a fundamental
right, nor even a constitutionally guaranteed interest.2 8 Thus, a
determination favoring the preponderance of the evidence standard
for actions pursuant to section 727(a) is consistent with the current
approach of the Supreme Court.
Given the inapplicability of the traditional justification for
requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence in allegations
based upon fraud, the judicial economy decisions regarding
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and the
application of standards of proof by the current Supreme Court, the
appropriate standard of proof in an action to deny discharge under
section 727(a) is a preponderance of the evidence.
Craig A. Barbarosh
217. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which the Supreme
Court has imposed the clear and convincing standard of proof).
218. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434,445-46 (1973) (stating that the debtor does not have
a fundamental ight or a constitutionally guaranteed interest in obtaining a bankruptcy discharge).
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